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DISTORTIONS IN THE MEASUREMENT OF THE EFFICIENCY OF FINANCIAL
LEVERAGE STRATEGIES IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY WHEN OPERATING LEASES
ARE IGNORED
Carl A. Scheraga
Paul Caster
Fairfield University
ABSTRACT
The Financial Accounting Standards Board and the International Accounting Standards Board have
set forth a proposal requiring companies to capitalize operating leases and include them as assets and
liabilities on their balance sheets. The proposal is motivated by the fact that current methods
accounting for operating leases hide a great deal of off-book leverage and thus are misleading to
investors. Such a change would have a significant impact on the U.S. airline industry where aircraft
and property operating leases are quite prevalent. This study utilizes an in-depth strategic
management perspective in examining how well U.S. airlines pursue optimization strategies with
regard to the management of financial leverage in order to achieve desired targets of growth and
profitability. Such benchmarking is accomplished by utilizing the DEA model suggested by
Capobianco and Fernandes (2004). This study demonstrates the distortion inherent in inter-airline
benchmarking when operating leases are not capitalized on the balance sheet.
INTRODUCTION
The accounting treatment of operating leases is
an ongoing subject of intense discussion by
those professional bodies responsible for
generally accepted accounting practices.
Currently, an operating lease is treated as a mere
rental agreement. The lessee records rent
expense with each payment, but nothing else.
The leased asset and the obligation for future
payments of rent are not recorded on the lessee’s
balance sheet. This gives rise to the familiar
phrase “off balance sheet financing.” As
operating leases are used in the airline industry
to a significant degree, capitalizing them to the
balance sheet, similar to their capital lease
counterparts, would have important impacts on
the measured leverage and risk positions of
airlines.
Gritta (1974), Gritta, Lippman, and Chow
(1994), and Gritta and Lippman (2010) provide a
thoughtful and comprehensive analysis of the
evolution of the reporting requirements with
regard to leasing instruments on the part of the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB).
Specifically, Gritta, Lippman, and Chow (1994),
describe the change in standards (SFAS No. 13,
1976) that now require that capital leases be
classified as leasehold assets and long term
liabilities on the balance sheet of companies,
that is, they are capitalized to the balance sheet.
Any change in the reporting requirements that
pertain to leasing activities significantly affects
the airline industry as leasing has been and
continues to be an important source of financing
for air carriers. This research is significant
because it highlights the impact of leasing
reporting requirements on the reported financial
leverage of airlines. Gritta (1974) and Gritta,
Lippman, and Chow (1994) demonstrated that a
change in reporting requirements for capital
leases had a significant and negative impact on
leverage ratios.
However, as noted above, operating leases
continue to be recorded as off-balance sheet
items. Operating leases are treated as mere rental
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agreements. Accounting rules do however
require certain disclosures in the footnotes that
accompany financial statements, including a
description of significant leased assets, the
obligation for future lease payments for each of
the next five years, and a lump sum obligation
for all years thereafter. This off-balance sheet
treatment of operating leases is attractive to
airlines. Park, Park and Hossan (2009) note that
this methodology allows operating leases to be
used as substitutes for debt financing while they
also attenuate the financial distress of the lessee.
Depreciation allowances associated with
operating leases and lease rentals also provide a
“tax shield benefit.” Lewellen, Long, and
McConnell (1976) suggest that operating leases
reduce the instant investment required to acquire
an asset. This would protect an airline’s liquidity.
Finally, Ezzell and Vora (2001) observe that
operating leases reduce external financing costs
for a firm.
In 2013, the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) issued an exposure draft that
would significantly change the lease accounting
rules in the United States. A similar proposal has
been made by the International Accounting
Standards Board (IASB). These accounting rule
makers believe that with few exceptions, all
lease contracts are in essence financing
agreements, and as such, all leases should be
recorded as capital leases. The proposals would
all but eliminate off balance sheet financing and
could have a tremendous impact on the financial
statements of those companies who currently
have significant amounts of operating leases. It
is interesting to note that major rating agencies,
including Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s,
already adjust financial statements so as to
estimate the impact of capitalizing operating
leases.  Gritta and Lippman (2010) demonstrate
that for a set of U.S. airlines for the year 2008,
capitalization of operating leases, by in large,
had a negative impact on air carriers’ financial
leverage.
The study above does note an interesting fact.
While for nearly all of the airlines in the study
there was an increase in their financial riskiness,
inter-firm comparisons of riskiness did not
change in terms of relative rankings. The ability
to make inter-firm comparisons and the
articulation of financial leverage as a strategic
instrument subject to managerial discretion are
at the heart of the present study.
FOCUS OF THE CURRENT STUDY
The Work of Capobianco and Fernandes
Capobianco and Fernandes (2004) developed a
model that presents a managerial approach for
the optimization of an airline’s capital structure.
Financial leverage is a strategic control variable
for airlines that is managed to positively impact
operating performance. Thus, in their model,
financial leverage is the independent variable
that determines the levels of the dependent
performance variables. The dependent
performance variables in their analysis are firm
size, profitability, and tangibility of assets.
Firm size is computed as the natural logarithm of
net sales. In an efficiently managed firm,
increases in financial leverage should be
associated with the acquisition of assets that
increase growth and profits. Additionally,
Capobianco and Fernandes (2004) argue that
large companies have more sources of capital
and are more diversified. Therefore, they display
a lower probability of bankruptcy than their
smaller counterparts. The low expected costs of
bankruptcy facilitate greater levels of financial
leverage. Thus, for firms managing their
probability of bankruptcy, an increase in
financial leverage should be associated with an
increase in size.
Profitability is computed as the ratio of net
income to total assets, or ROA. Basically, what
is being represented here is the relationship
between financial leverage and the return on
equity (ROE). The relationship between ROA
and ROE can be illustrated by means of the
DuPont decomposition: ROE = Profits/Sales x
Sales/Assets x Assets/Equity. ROA is the first
two components of the DuPont decomposition
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because ROA = Profits/Sales x Sales/Assets =
Profits/Assets. return on equity measures the rate
of return on the ownership interest
(shareholders’ equity) of common stockholders.
Therefore, it shows how well a company uses
investment funds to generate earnings growth.
Return on assets shows how profitable a
company’s assets are in generating revenuereturn
on equity measures the rate of return on the
ownership interest (shareholders’ equity) of
common stockholders. Therefore, it shows how
well a company uses investment funds to
generate earnings growth. Return on assets
shows how profitable a company’s assets are in
generating revenue.return on equity measures the
rate of return on the ownership interest
(shareholders’ equity) of common stockholders.
Therefore, it shows how well a company uses
investment funds to generate earnings growth.
Return on assets shows how profitable a
company’s assets are in generating
revenue.return on equity measures the rate of
return on the ownership interest (shareholders’
equity) of common stockholders. Therefore, it
shows how well a company uses investment
funds to generate earnings growth. Return on
assets shows how profitable a company’s assets
are in generating revenue.Similar to Myers and
Majluf (1984), Capobianco and Fernandes
(2004) hypothesize that profitable firms prefer
not to raise debt levels by means of internal
funding. Additionally, Jensen (1986) notes that
the use of debt (as opposed to equity) reduces
the agency costs of free cash flow by reducing
the cash flow available for spending at the
discretion of managers. Therefore, the third term
in the DuPont decomposition will increase.
Thus, as above, for firms who use financial
leverage to acquire assets to increase growth and
profits, one should observe that as financial
leverage increases so too should ROA and ROE
increase.
Finally, “tangibility” is the ratio of fixed to total
assets. This ratio is a proxy for operating
leverage. Profitable firms will manage their total
risk position as represented by the sum of
financial and operating leverage. As financial
leverage increases, it is expected that profitable
firms will attempt to reduce operating leverage.
Capobianco and Fernandes (2004) utilize the
inverse of the ratio for tangibility (tangibility-1).
Therefore, as financial leverage increases, this
inverse ratio will increase.
Capobianco and Fernandes (2004) investigate
inter-firm efficiencies in the management of
financial leverage by means of data envelopment
analysis. They utilize an eclectic sample of
airlines, U.S. and international, passenger and
cargo. Their pooled sample spanned the years
1993 to 1997 and initially included yearly
observations for 53 companies from 32
countries. Not all companies had data for all five
years. Companies that displayed negative ROA
and negative stockholder equity were eliminated.
Additional companies were eliminated if they
displayed values for the model variables that
were individually greater than three standard
deviations above the average for that particular
variable.
In addition to the inclusion of non-passenger
airlines such as Federal Express, differences in
accounting standards across countries make
inter-firm comparisons difficult. Capobianco and
Fernandes (2004) note that, where the financial
reports of international airlines disclosed
original accounting entries, they attempted to
reconstruct a template that reflects a single set of
accounting principles. This was done, as much
as possible, in accordance with the standards set
forth by the International Accounting Standard
Committee and those set forth by the
International Transport Association with regard
to specific topics that affect the airline industry.
After generating efficiency scores from the data
envelopment analysis, Capobianco and
Fernandes (2004) examine the relationship
between these scores and airlines’ rankings on
each of the analysis variables in their model.
More specifically, they observe the movement of
airlines over the five year period with regard to
combinations of indebtedness and return on
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assets and relate these movements to airlines’
efficiency scores.
The Current Study
 The model developed by Capobianco and
Fernandes (2004) is important in that it provides
a proactive managerial context for the strategic
management of financial leverage. It is based on
an extensive analysis of the finance literature.
The relationships between the dependent
variables of firm size, profitability, and
tangibility and the independent variable of
financial leverage are drawn from the Static
Trade-Off Model, the Pecking Order Hypothesis
and the Agency Cost Model. The authors
provide a detailed summary of this literature to
provide transparency to the inter-variable
relationships that they adopt in their analysis.
This study extends their analysis by re-
examining inter-firm efficiencies when directly
accounting for operating leases. This is more
than a simple academic exercise. As seen in
Table 1, for the year 2008, the midpoint of the
current study, many airlines had a significant
proportion of aircraft financed using operating
TABLE 1
PERCENTAGE OF AIRCRAFT UNDER OPERATING LEASES - 2008
AIRLINE % UNDER OPERATING LEASES
AIRTRAN 73.53
ALASKA 35.04
ALLEGIANT 4.65
CONTINENTAL 56.83
DELTA 18.97
FRONTIER 70.59
HAWAIIAN 66.67
JETBLUE 38.46
REPUBLIC 30.00
SKYWEST 74.38
SOUTHWEST 16.40
UNITED 36.83
leases. As these kinds of leases are treated as off-
balance sheet items, it is not immediately
obvious, under current accounting rules, what
the true efficacy of financial leverage strategies
being practiced by airlines really is.  Again, as
noted above, this is an ongoing concern of both
the FASB and IASB.
Interestingly, Capobianco and Fernandes (2004)
mention leasing issues in passing, but implicitly
recognize capital leases but not the potential
impact of operating leases when they assert:
“Yet it is possible to lease rather than
purchase airplanes in the aviation
industry, which would have an impact on
operating costs and not on assets. Despite
the apparent paradox, our tests concern
efficiency and do not include a
dependence relation between variables”
(pp. 426-427).
This study explicitly capitalizes operating leases
to the balance sheet. It then uses the DEA model
of Capobianco and Fernandes to demonstrate
that a failure to capitalize operating leases can
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cause a significant distortion in the measurement
of inter-firm efficiencies and therefore does not
accurately capture the skill of managers in
utilizing financial leverage as a strategic tool.
METHODOLOGY
Data Sample
An initial sample of 13 U.S. airlines was utilized
in this study. The time period over which the
sample was drawn and pooled was 2006-2010.
The pooling process was done across the years
in the sample and across observations both
unadjusted and adjusted for the capitalization of
operating leases. The sample was restricted to
U.S. airlines to avoid the accounting problems
encountered by Capobianco and Fernandes
(2004) with regard to differences in countries’
internal reporting rules. The sample was also
restricted to passenger airlines. American
Airlines was not in the sample because for four
of the five years of the study it reported negative
stockholders’ equity. To be included in the
pooled sample, an airline had to have the
necessary data for at least two of the five years.
Using this criterion, USAir was eliminated after
an outlier analysis was performed.
Capobianco and Fernandes (2004) identify
outliers by examining each of the DEA variables
individually and eliminating those observations
where a particular variable is greater than three
standard deviations from the mean of that
variable. In this study the Mahalanobis D2
measure was utilized to perform a multivariate
detection of outliers, as outlined in Hair, Black,
Babin, Anderson, and Tatham (2006). This
measure is a multidimensional assessment of
each observation across a set of variables
simultaneously. The Mahalanobis D2 measure
evaluates each observation’s distance in
multidimensional space from the mean center of
all observations. The D2 measure divided by the
number of variables under consideration is
approximately distributed as a t-value. An
extremely conservative approach was taken with
a threshold value of 3.00 (p = .005) being used.
The airlines in the final dataset are listed in
Table 2.
TABLE 2
AIRLINES IN POOLED SAMPLE
AIRLINE Years
AIRTRAN 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010
ALASKA 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010
ALLEGIANT 2006, 2007, 2008, 2010
CONTINENTAL 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010
DELTA 2007, 2010
FRONTIER 2006, 2007, 2008
HAWAIIAN 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010
JETBLUE 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010
REPUBLIC 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010
SKYWEST 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010
SOUTHWEST 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010
UNITED 2006, 2007
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DEA Model Utilized
As in the study by Capobianco and Fernandes
(2004), the input-oriented BCC data
envelopment analysis model with variable
returns to scale was utilized. The details of this
model are provided in Appendix 1. The BCC
model also provides the researcher an advantage
in terms of admissible data. Capobianco and
Fernandes eliminated those observations which
displayed negative ROA. This followed from the
fact that, in general, the utilization of DEA
requires that input and output variables be
greater than zero. However, as summarized in
Bowlin (1998), Ali and Seiford (1990) and
Pastor (1996) have demonstrated that, for a
variable that is not positive, an affine
displacement does not alter the efficient frontier.
Thus, certain formulations of the DEA model -
the additive model for both inputs and outputs
and the BCC model for outputs - are translation
invariant. Therefore, in this study, a positive
amount was added to the negative values of
ROA. It is required that the same adjustment
must be made to ROA values for all firms in the
dataset in order to not alter the efficiency
frontier. As an aside, it might be asked as to why
the additive model was not utilized which would
have, in theory, allowed for the inclusion of
observations with negative financial leverage
values because of negative stockholder equity.
However, the construction of the financial
leverage variable does not allow for the
utilization of a single, linear affine displacement.
Additionally, the additive model does not lend
itself to the same straightforward interpretation
of results to which the BCC model does.
CAPITALIZATION METHODOLOGY FOR
OPERATING LEASES
Expanding on the discussion above, a survey of
the methodologies used by credit rating agencies
to capitalize operating leases revealed two basic
approaches – the first as utilized by Moody’s and
the second as utilized by Standard & Poor’s (see
Berman, 2007 and Standard & Poor’s 2005 and
2008). Moody’s employs the so-called factor
method. A multiple of current rent expense is
used to capitalize operating lease obligations.
This approach is meant to capture the purchase
of the whole asset as opposed to the present
value of contractual obligations. The notion here
is that to sustain cash flow, the firm must have
the asset or some replacement thereof. The
multiple utilized varies by industry sector with
multiples being limited to 5x, 6x, and 8x rent
expense. Airlines have the highest multiple
reflecting the long economic life of assets
employed.
Standard & Poor’s utilizes an approach that
capitalizes operating leases by calculating the
present value of reported minimum lease
commitments that appear in the notes of a firm’s
financial statements. Unlike the Moody’s
approach, here the objective is to capture the
discounted value of future payment obligations
and not to recognize the whole asset associated
with the lease as though it was actually owned
by the firm. This methodology, the one used in
this study, is illustrated in Appendix 2. Notice
that the discount rate employed is based on an
estimate of the firm’s actual borrowing costs and
hence will be a function of inter-year changes in
borrowing costs. Finally, Standard and Poor’s, in
reflecting on the factor method employed by
Moody’s suggests that:
“The factor methods use multiples of
annual expense to estimate the asset
value - typically in a crude or arbitrary
fashion. Also, while incorporating the
equivalent of owning the entire asset,
these methodologies lack the ability to
differentiate between the first year of the
asset’s life, the last year, and all points in
between. (An asset actually purchased
would be depreciated over its life.) And,
by putting leasing and ownership on a
supposed “apples-to-apples” basis, they
gloss over the potential flexibility
associated with leasing only part of an
asset’s economic life.” (Standard and
Poor’s, 2005, p. 5)
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The means and standard deviations for the
unadjusted and adjusted (capitalization of
operating leases) are reported in Table 3.
RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS
The data envelopment analysis was performed
via the Efficiency Measurement System (EMS),
version 1.3 which is authored by Dr. Holger
Scheel of the University of Dortmund. Mean
normalization was utilized to make sure the data
was of the same or similar magnitude within the
data set. The process to mean normalize is taken
in two simple steps. The first step is to find the
mean of the data set for each input and output.
The second step is to divide each input or output
by the mean for that specific factor.
Table 4 shows that when unadjusted and
adjusted observations were pooled over time, the
adjusted observations consistently displayed
worse values for operating efficiency, i.e., lower
values of è. In the context of the input-oriented
BCC model, 1è represents the percent reduction
in the input (financial leverage) necessary to
move a particular observation to the efficient
frontier. An observation is efficient if 0 = 1.
These results are interesting, but the real
question is whether on average the differences in
è are statistically significant and even more
important is whether these differences are of
significant magnitude. To address this issue a t-
test of means for a paired two-sample was
performed. The expected statistically significant
difference in means was found. More
importantly, the percentage difference in means
(0= 0.5624 versus 0 = 0.3882) was 44.87
percent.
The changes observed in financial leverage
efficiency, as captured by 0, is a function of two
factors. The first is the relative change due to the
capitalization of operating leases to the balance
sheet - unadjusted versus adjusted observations.
This accounts for part of the shift in 0. The
second is a magnification effect. This
magnification effect is due to differences in the
intensity of use of operating leases. We measure
this intensity by the percentage of operating
leases relative to total adjusted assets where total
adjusted assets include operating leases (OPL/
TA). Thus, the second factor is the relative
change between unadjusted and adjusted
observations and within the adjusted group of
observations themselves.
This latter factor is explored in tables 6 and 7.
The values for 0 (from lowest to highest) were
divided into quartiles. Table 6 displays the
movement of airlines between worst and best
quartile values for 0 and their associated values
TABLE 3
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF VARIABLES
UNADJUSTED
VARIABLE FINANCIAL LEVERAGE (LN) SIZE ROA TANGIBILITY-1
MEAN 6.918 14.936 0.049 1.787
STDEV 7.984 1.109 0.045 0.540
ADJUSTED
VARIABLE FINANCIAL LEVERAGE (LN) SIZE ROA TANGIBILITY-1
MEAN 10.561 14.936 0.037 1.440
STDEV 12.481 1.109 0.038 0.283
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TABLE 4
POOLED DEA RESULTS – UNADJUSTED AND ADJUSTED
AIRLINE 0 - UNADJUSTED 0 – ADJUSTED
AIRTRAN 2006 0.4411 0.1878
AIRTRAN 2007 0.4088 0.2030
AIRTRAN 2008 0.2264 0.1127
AIRTRAN 2009 0.4288 0.2222
AIRTRAN 2010 0.4836 0.2416
ALASKA 2006 0.4454 0.3167
ALASKA 2007 0.4424 0.3484
ALASKA 2008 0.2669 0.2181
ALASKA 2009 0.3426 0.2770
ALASKA 2010 0.4441 0.3660
ALLEGIANT 2006 0.9580 0.9264
ALLEGIANT 2007 1.0000 0.9180
ALLEGIANT 2008 0.9795 0.9106
ALLEGIANT 2010 1.0000 0.9619
CONTINENTAL 2006 0.0803 0.0409
CONTINENTAL 2007 0.6840 0.1858
CONTINENTAL 2009 0.1179 0.0651
CONTINENTAL 2010 0.6556 0.3563
DELTA 2007 1.0000 0.8452
DELTA 2010 1.0000 0.8136
FRONTIER 2006 0.4116 0.2063
FRONTIER 2007 0.3558 0.1646
FRONTIER 2008 0.2189 0.1291
HAWAIIAN 2006 0.4668 0.1093
HAWAIIAN 2007 0.7726 0.1831
HAWAIIAN 2008 0.2596 0.0575
HAWAIIAN 2009 1.0000 0.1831
HAWAIIAN 2010 0.7759 0.2829
JETBLUE 2006 0.3694 0.2818
JETBLUE 2007 0.3531 0.2797
JETBLUE 2008 0.4051 0.3307
JETBLUE 2009 0.4533 0.3784
JETBLUE 2010 0.4897 0.4079
REPUBLIC 2006 0.3813 0.2798
REPUBLIC 2007 0.2745 0.2059
REPUBLIC 2008 0.2658 0.2129
REPUBLIC 2009 0.2122 0.1609
REPUBLIC 2010 0.2660 0.2028
SKYWEST 2006 0.6069 0.3733
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TABLE 4 (Continued)
POOLED DEA RESULTS – UNADJUSTED AND ADJUSTED
AIRLINE 0 - UNADJUSTED  0 – ADJUSTED
SKYWEST 2007 0.6040 0.3846
SKYWEST 2008 0.6164 0.3954
SKYWEST 2009 0.5944 0.3860
SKYWEST 2010 0.6083 0.4033
SOUTHWEST 2006 1.0000 0.8829
SOUTHWEST 2007 0.9279 0.8241
SOUTHWEST 2008 0.8140 0.7275
SOUTHWEST 2009 0.8677 0.7551
SOUTHWEST 2010 1.0000 0.8807
UNITED 2006 0.3442 0.2551
UNITED 2007 1.0000 0.5701
MEAN 0.5624 0.3882
TABLE 5
T-TEST: PAIRED TWO SAMPLE FOR MEANS (0)
UNADJUSTED ADJUSTED % DIFF
MEAN 0.5624 0.3882 44.87%
VARIANCE 0.0802 0.0750
OBSERVATIONS 50 50
PEARSON CORRELATION 0.8408
HYPOTHESIZED MEAN DIFFERENCE 0
DF 49
T STAT 7.824
P(T d” t) ONE-TAIL 1.7749E-10
T CRITICAL ONE-TAIL 1.6766
P(T d” t) TWO-TAIL 3.5498E-10
T CRITICAL TWO-TAIL 2.0096
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TABLE 6
UNADJUSTED AND ADJUSTED QUARTILES/ OPERATING LEASES AS A PERCENTAGE
OF TOTAL ADJUSTED ASSEST (RANK)
Quartile 1: 0.0409 d” 0 < 0.2484
Quartile 2: 0.2484 d” 0 < 0.3853
Quartile 3: 0.3853 d” 0 < 0.7413
Quartile 4: 0.7413 d” 0  d” 1.000
AIRLINE 0 - UNADJ QUART 0 – ADJ QUART OL/TA RANKOL/TA
AIRTRAN 2006 0.4411 3 0.1878 1 57.41% 1
AIRTRAN 2007 0.4088 3 0.2030 1 50.34% 3
AIRTRAN 2008 0.2264 1 0.1127 1 50.03% 4
AIRTRAN 2009 0.4288 3 0.2222 1 46.16% 9
AIRTRAN 2010 0.4836 3 0.2416 1 48.48% 7
ALASKA 2006 0.4454 3 0.3167 2 24.54% 27
ALASKA 2007 0.4424 3 0.3484 2 21.26% 31
ALASKA 2008 0.2669 2 0.2181 1 18.15% 37
ALASKA 2009 0.3426 2 0.2770 2 18.19% 36
ALASKA 2010 0.4441 3 0.3660 2 15.00% 41
ALLEGIANT 2006 0.9580 4 0.9264 4 1.86% 50
ALLEGIANT 2007 1.0000 4 0.9180 4 4.70% 47
ALLEGIANT 2008 0.9795 4 0.9106 4 4.52% 48
ALLEGIANT 2010 1.0000 4 0.9619 4 3.81% 49
CONTINENTAL 2006 0.0803 1 0.0409 1 48.91% 6
CONTINENTAL 2007 0.6840 3 0.1858 1 46.95% 8
CONTINENTAL 2009 0.1179 1 0.0651 1 44.54% 10
CONTINENTAL 2010 0.6556 3 0.3563 2 38.54% 14
DELTA 2007 1.0000 4 0.8452 4 15.48% 40
DELTA 2010 1.0000 4 0.8136 4 18.64% 34
FRONTIER 2006 0.4116 3 0.2063 1 49.88% 5
FRONTIER 2007 0.3558 2 0.1646 1 53.73% 2
FRONTIER 2008 0.2189 1 0.1291 1 41.01% 12
HAWAIIAN 2006 0.4668 3 0.1093 1 38.01% 16
HAWAIIAN 2007 0.7726 4 0.1831 1 35.19% 20
HAWAIIAN 2008 0.2596 2 0.0575 1 43.60% 11
HAWAIIAN 2009 1.0000 4 0.1831 1 39.64% 13
HAWAIIAN 2010 0.7759 4 0.2829 2 36.38% 17
JETBLUE 2006 0.3694 2 0.2818 2 23.72% 30
JETBLUE 2007 0.3531 2 0.2797 2 20.79% 32
JETBLUE 2008 0.4051 3 0.3307 2 18.38% 38
JETBLUE 2009 0.4533 3 0.3784 2 16.52% 39
JETBLUE 2010 0.4897 3 0.4079 3 16.71% 38
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of operating leases as a percentage of total
adjusted assets. Table 7 displays the Pearson
correlation coefficients between the values of
OPL/TA and the difference between the
unadjusted value for 0 and the adjusted value for
0 (DIFF) as well as the absolute value of the
percentage difference between the unadjusted
value for 0 and the adjusted value for 0 (PDIFF).
In both cases, the correlation is statistically
significant at the .01 level.
These relationships are explored in more detail
in another manner in Table 8.
The values of OPL/TA across the total sample
(from lowest to highest) were divided into
quartiles. To investigate the statistical
significance of the differences in DIFF and
PDIFF between the quartiles, the Tukey-Kramer
method (Tukey 1953, Kramer 1956) was
utilized. The original Tukey test (1952) was
designed specifically for pair-wise comparisons
based on the studentized range ratio (see formula
TABLE 6 (Continued)
POOLED DEA RESULTS – UNADJUSTED AND ADJUSTED
AIRLINE 0 - UNADJ QUART 0 – ADJ QUART OL/TA RANKOL/TA
REPUBLIC 2006 0.3813 2 0.2798 2 26.63% 23
REPUBLIC 2007 0.2745 2 0.2059 1 24.99% 26
REPUBLIC 2008 0.2658 2 0.2129 1 19.90% 33
REPUBLIC 2009 0.2122 1 0.1609 1 24.18% 28
REPUBLIC 2010 0.2660 2 0.2028 1 23.78% 29
SKYWEST 2006 0.6069 3 0.3733 2 38.50% 15
SKYWEST 2007 0.6040 3 0.3846 2 36.33% 18
SKYWEST 2008 0.6164 3 0.3954 3 35.85% 19
SKYWEST 2009 0.5944 3 0.3860 3 35.07% 21
SKYWEST 2010 0.6083 3 0.4033 3 33.71% 22
SOUTHWEST 2006 1.0000 4 0.8829 4 11.71% 44
SOUTHWEST 2007 0.9279 4 0.8241 4 9.79% 46
SOUTHWEST 2008 0.8140 4 0.7275 3 10.62% 45
SOUTHWEST 2009 0.8677 4 0.7551 4 12.97% 42
SOUTHWEST 2010 1.0000 4 0.8807 4 11.93% 43
UNITED 2006 0.3442 2 0.2551 2 25.89% 24
UNITED 2007 1.0000 4 0.5701 3 25.66% 25
below) and controls the maximum experiment-
wise error rate (MEER) when the sample sizes
are equal. Tukey (1953) and Kramer (1956)
independently proposed a modification for
unequal cell sizes and it is the Tukey-Kramer
method that was used in this study.  Hayter
(1984) provided proof that the Tukey-Kramer
procedure controls the MEER and it has also
fared well in Monte Carlo studies (Dunnett
1980).  Specifically, for two groups yi and yj,
with ni  and nj observations in each group
respectively and s being the root mean square
error based on í degrees of freedom, their means
iy and jy are considered significantly different
by the Tukey-Kramer criterion if:
),;(2/)/1/1(/|| νκαqnnsyy jiji ≥+−
where q(á;ê,í) is the á-level critical value of a
studentized range distribution of ê independent
normal random variables with í degrees of
freedom. The software utilized is the GLM
(General Linear Model) procedure in the SAS
(2002) statistical package, which calculates
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TABLE 7
PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
DIFF PDIFF OPL/TA
DIFF 1.0000***
PDIFF -0.7679*** 1.0000***
OPL/TA 0.4443*** -0.8470*** 1.0000***
***: Significant at the .01 level
DIFF = Difference between the unadjusted value for 0 and the adjusted value for 0
PDIFF| = Percentage difference between the unadjusted value for 0  and the adjusted value for 0
OPL/TA = Operating leases as a percentage of total adjusted assets
TABLE 8
TUKEY STUDENTIZED RANGE TESTS BY QUARTILES FOR OPL/TA
Quartile 1: 0.0186 d” OL/TA < 0.1671
Quartile 2: 0.1671 d” OL/TA < 0.2533
Quartile 3: 0.2533 d” OL/TA < 0.3964
Quartile 4: 0.3964 d” OL/TA d” 0.5741
1 versus 2 0.0062
1 versus 3 -0.1983 **
1 versus 4 -0.1508 **
2 versus 3 -0.2044 **
2 versus 4 -0.1570 **
3 versus 4 0.0475
**: Statistically significant at the .05 level
1 versus 2 -0.1057
1 versus 3 -0.3389 **
1 versus 4 -0.4506 **
2 versus 3 -0.2332 **
2 versus 4 -0.3450 **
3 versus 4 -0.1118
**: Statistically significant at the .05 level
QUANTILE COMPARISON
VARIABLE: DIFF
DIFFERENCE
IN MEANS
DIFFERENCE
IN MEANS
QUANTILE COMPARISON
VARIABLE: PDIFF
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significance for the Tukey-Kramer statistic at the
5% level.  As can be seen in table 8, the
differences in the mean values of DIFF and
PDIFF for all of the non-adjacent quartiles (1
versus 3 and 4, 2 versus 3 and 4) are statistically
significant at the .05 level.
CONCLUSION
The model developed by Capobianco and
Fernandes (2004) describes the strategic decision
process on the part of managers with regard to
an airline’s chosen capital structure. The
framework chosen draws upon the substantial
finance literature pertaining to the optimization
of said capital structure. Furthermore, the
efficacy of a given manager’s strategic decisions
with regard to the nature and sources of capital
for a given airline can be benchmarked against
those of peer airlines. This is done by means of
data envelopment analysis.
However, this study demonstrates that any such
benchmarking results that are generated need to
be called into question when operating leases are
“hidden” by not capitalizing them to the balance
sheet. This is a source of ongoing debate for
both the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) and the International Accounting
Standards Board (IASB). The variables that are
central to the Capbianco and Fernandes model
are compromised when operating leases are not
capitalized to the balance sheet because both the
operating and net income of the firm will be
lowered, the debt and capital for the firm will be
understated, and the return on equity and capital
will be much higher (Damodaran, 2006, pp. 86-
88).
Thus, not capitalizing operating leases to the
balance sheet creates significant distortions in
the perceptions and assessment of the abilities of
managers to utilize financial leverage to make
investments that enhance firm profitability. This
is very much noted by Standard & Poor’s (2008,
pp. 22-23) who note that:
“…We view the accounting distinction
between operating and capital leases as
substantially artificial. In both cases the
lessee contracts for the use of an asset,
entering into a debt-like obligation to
make periodic rental payments…”
They further add with regard to their own
adjustment methodology:
“…The operating-lease-adjustment
model is intended to bring companies’
financial ratios closer to the underlying
economics and more comparable, by
taking into consideration all financial
obligations incurred, whether on or off
balance sheet. The model improves our
analysis of how profitably a company
employs its leased and owned assets…”
This then is the underlying rationale that
motivates the empirical investigation undertaken
in this paper. The results suggest an approach to
better understanding the economic consequences
of managerial behavior as it relates to the
efficacy of financial leverage strategies.
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APPENDIX 1
THE BCC INPUT-ORIENTED MODEL
        subject to      
      
      
      ë, s+, s- e” 0.
where X is the input vector utilized, Y is the output vector produced,  represents a non-
archimedean constant which is smaller than any positive real number that ensures no input or
output is given a zero weight,  is a row vector of 1s, and s+ and s- are the slack vectors for outputs
and inputs. è represents the level of efficiency of the firm defined by (X
0
,Y
0
).  A firm is efficient if è =
1 and s+ = s- = 0. The optimal value of ë forms a composite unit outperforming the decision making
unit (DMU) under consideration and provides targets for the DMU in the identification of the
sources of its inefficiency.
APPENDIX 2
S&P METHODOLOGY FOR CAPITALIZATION OF OPERATING LEASES*
EXAMPLE OF ALASKA AIRLINES 2006 (000s)
2006 2005
TOTAL REPORTED DEBT 1,150,800 1,082,600
TOTAL INTEREST
(INCLUDING CAPITALIZED 78,000 63,000
INTEREST)
IMPLIED INTEREST RATE 6.98%
ACTUAL RENT EXPENSE 320,600 324,800
FUTURE MINIMUM
LEASE COMMITMENTS 2007 246,800
2008 237,300
2009 218,200
2010 207,700
2011 177,400
THEREAFTER 680,600
TOTAL LEASE
OBLIGATIONS 1,768,000
S&P - PRESENT VAKUE OF
LEASE COMMITMENTS 1,326,229
TOTAL REPORTED DEBT
AND CAPITALIZED LEASES 2,477,029
*To compute the present value of the lease obligations, a judgment is made with regard to the
lump sum commitment in year 6. Based on the average annual lease commitment over the first
5 years ($217,480) an annuity of 3 years is arrived at ($680,600/217,480) = 3.13 or 3 using the
integer component (Damodaran, 2006).
All data is taken from the relevant 10-K reports.
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